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LOOKING BEYOND THE MERCY/JUSTICE
DICHOTOMY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF MERCY AND
JUSTICE IN JEWISH LAW AND TRADITION
SAMUEL J. LEVINEt
INTRODUCTION
In one of his earliest encyclicals, Dives in Misericordia, Pope
John Paul II explored the concepts of mercy and kindness, with a
focus on notions of divine love and compassion.1 Although the
encyclical relies, of course, primarily upon Christian sources and
theology, the Pope dedicated a section of the work specifically to
a discussion of the importance of mercy in the Hebrew
Scriptures.2 In this section, the Pope addressed the complex
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I See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVES INMISERICORDIA passim (1980)
[hereinafter DIVES IN MISERICORDL4]. The pope further developed these themes in
later years, including two important addresses in January of 2002. See John Paul II,
Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace 2002, No Peace Without
Justice, No Justice Without Forgiveness (Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/johnpaul iilmessages/peace/documents/hf jp-
iimes_20011211 xxxv-world-day-for-peace-en.html; John Paul II, Address to the
Representatives of the World Religions on the Day of Prayer for Peace in the World
(Jan. 24, 2002), available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john-paul-ii/
speeches/2002/january/documents/hfjp-ii-spe_20020124discorso-assisien.html.
2 See DIVES IN MISERICORDIA, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting 2 Chronicles 30:9;
Esther 4:17; Exodus 3:7; 4:22; 34:6; Hosea 2:3, 21-25; 11:7-9; 14:5; 15; Isaiah 1:18;
45:21; 49:15; 51:4-16; 54:6-8, 10; 56:1; 63:9; 63:16; Jeremiah 31:3, 20; Job, passim;
Judges 3:7-9; 1 Kings 8:22-53; Micah 7:18-20; Nehemiah 9; Numbers 14:18;
Psalms 40:11; 86; 98:2; 103; 145; 2 Samuel 11; 12; 24:10). Referring to several of the
Pope's encyclicals, Eugene Fisher suggested that the Pope "attempted over the years
to integrate into his overall teachings the insights he [ ] derived from his contacts
with Jewish leaders and his continuing meditation upon the meaning of Jewish
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issue of the relationship between mercy and justice-attributes of
both divine and human conduct that often seem in tension, if not
in direct conflict with each other.3  Indeed, the Pope first
observes that in Scriptures, "mercy is in a certain sense
contrasted with God's justice, and in many cases is shown to be
not only more powerful than.., justice but also more profound."4
Upon further reflection, however, viewing mercy and justice in
connection with the attribute of love, the Pope suggests that
"[l]ove, so to speak, conditions justice and, in the final analysis,
justice serves love." 5 In addition, he writes, "[t]he primacy and
superiority of love vis-A-vis justice.., are revealed precisely
through mercy."6 Therefore, reformulating his depiction of the
relationship between mercy and justice, the Pope concludes that,
ultimately, "[m]ercy differs from justice, but is not in opposition
to it." 7
Building upon these observations, and drawing extensively
on the work of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik and other scholars of
Jewish law and philosophy, this Essay briefly considers the
complementary roles of justice and mercy in Jewish tradition.
Toward that end, the Essay places these concepts in a broader
perspective, viewing mercy as representative of attributes such
as kindness, compassion, love, and peacefulness, while
understanding justice in terms of more exacting principles, such
as strict adherence to truth and objective logic.
In particular, the Essay begins with a look at the figure of
Abraham, the father and founder of the Jewish nation, who
embodied the characteristic of kindness, but exercised it within
tradition for Catholic thought." Eugene J. Fisher, A Commentary on the Texts, in
POPE JOHN PAUL II, SPIRITUAL PILGRIMAGE: TEXTS ON JEWS AND JUDAISM, 1979-
1995 xxxix (Eugene J. Fisher & Leon Klenicki eds., 1995).
3 See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution,
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1321-22 (2004). Garvey describes the
view that mercy should be understood as "the partial or complete remission of
deserved punishment," id. at 1321, and therefore posits that retributive justice and
mercy "necessarily conflict ... because justice means giving an offender the
punishment... deserve[d]," id. at 1321 n.17. Cf. Robert Weisberg, Apology,
Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2004) (observing "widely
disparate views of legal scholars on the relationship between mercy and justice-i.e.,
whether mercy is consistent with, entailed by, or actually subversive of justice"); see
also infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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the context of the pursuit of justice. The Essay then examines
the role and character of communal leaders, who sometimes must
resort to elements of strict justice, but at other times may also
require the capacity to temper justice with mercy. Finally, the
Essay turns to the juridical setting, considering the possibility
that an ideal form of justice might incorporate a meaningful and
appropriate measure of mercy.8
I. ABRAHAM: MERCY AND JUSTICE IN THE
FOUNDING OF THE NATION
The Biblical figure Abraham occupies a unique position in
the Book of Genesis and, more generally, in Jewish thought,
serving as father and founder in the emergence of the new nation
that will play a central role throughout the Bible. In fact,
Abraham's imprint on the defining characteristics of the nation
proves so profound as to render anachronistic references to
Abraham as a member of the "Nation of Israel" or the "Jewish
Nation," titles that derive from the names of Abraham's grandson
and great-grandson, respectively. Similarly, because Abraham's
relationship with God predated by hundreds of years the giving
of the Torah at Mount Sinai, Abraham's service to God was
primarily based not in the observance of specific laws and rituals
later revealed to the nation, but rather in broader principles of
imitatio Dei, following in God's ways.9
Indeed, as the Talmud 10 understands the imperative of
imitatio Dei in the context of the Biblical description of God as
"rachum v'chanun,"11 exercising mercy and kindness, 12 Jewish
8 For a helpful discussion of approaches in American legal scholarship aimed at
reconciling the apparent conflict between justice and mercy, see Garvey, supra note
3, at 1321-22 n.17 (2004).
9 See YITZCHAK HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHAK: SHAVUOTH 59-60, 100 (1999). For
a discussion of the imperative of Imitatio Dei in Jewish thought, see Samuel J.
Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative,
1998 UTAH L. REV. 465, 490-92 & nn. 130-35.
10 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sabbath 133b.
11 Exodus 34:6 (New American).
12 See JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, OUT OF THE WHIRLWIND: ESSAYS ON
MOURNING, SUFFERING, AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 207, 207-209 (David Shatz et
al. eds., 2003) (stating that "the categorical norm within our ethical system, imitatio
Dei, is correlated with the ideal of [c]hesed," as "God's act of creation manifested the
attribute of [c]hesed," and explaining that, although chesed is often translated as
"loving kindness," it more accurately denotes "[s]elf-transcendence and the surge
toward the other").
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tradition identifies the same qualities as the most prominent of
Abraham's attributes. 13 Moreover, through a close analysis of
Abraham's behavior, Jewish ethical literature has emphasized
that Abraham's caring and compassion went beyond the noble
conduct of responding when a situation of need was brought to
his attention. 14  Instead, Abraham initiated the pursuit of
opportunities to perform acts of kindness, seeking out and
finding situations in which he could assist others. 15
One of the most powerful manifestations of Abraham's
profound desire to help others is illustrated in the hospitality he
shows the three "men" or angels who appear at his tent,16 an
episode that Jewish exegetical tradition understands as
paradigmatic of Abraham's kindness.' 7  Elaborating on the
Biblical text, the Midrash paints the picture of an old man
recovering from surgery, sitting at the door of his tent in the heat
of the day with the hope that he will observe passersby. When he
sees three apparent idolaters walking near his tent, he interrupts
an encounter with God,' 8 runs to greet his prospective guests,
ushers them into the tent, prepares with great alacrity an
elaborate meal to fit their tastes, and stands at their service
while they eat, offering both spiritual and physical sustenance. 9
Thus, rather than waiting for others to approach him, Abraham
eagerly sacrifices his own comfort, literally running from his tent
to attend to the needs of complete strangers.
Perhaps more strikingly, Abraham's expressions of mercy
extend to those who seem least deserving of such kindness.
13 See, e.g., 2 ELIYAHU DESSLER, MICHTAV M'ELIYAHU 178-79 (Aryeh Carmell &
Chaim Friedlander eds., 1963); 1 CHAIM YAAKOV GOLDVICHT, ASUFATH
MA'ARACHOTH 129-54; HUTNER, supra note 9, at 59-60, 100; ADIN STEINSALTZ, IN
THE BEGINNING: DISCOURSES ON CHASIDIC THOUGHT 123-29 [hereinafter
STEINSALTZ, IN THE BEGINNING] (Yehuda Hanegbi ed. and trans., 1992).
14 See DESSLER, supra note 13, at 178-79.
15 See id.
16 Genesis 18:2.
17 See DESSLER, supra note 13, at 178 (citing sources).
18 Indeed, the Talmud derives from Abraham's conduct the principle that
hospitality to guests is "greater" than accepting God's presence. See TALMUD BAVLI,
Sabbath 127a. For an analysis of this principle, see DESSLER, supra note 13, at 180;
HERSHEL SCHACHTER, MIPNINEI HARAv 271 (2001). For a discussion of the
importance of hospitality in Jewish thought, see RABBENU BACHYA BEN ASHER, Kad
Ha-kemach, in KISVEI RABBENU BACHYA 35-40 (Chaim Dov Chavel ed., 1995).
19 For a discussion of the significance of Abraham's standing at the service of
the guests, see RABBI CHAIM YAAKOv GOLDVICHT, ARBA'A MA'AMRIM B'AGGADA 21-
31 (1984).
LOOKING BEYOND MERCY AND JUSTICE
Immediately following the visit of the three angels, God informs
Abraham of the impending destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah,
a punishment warranted by the cruelty and selfishness that
epitomize these cities.20 Abraham responds in petition and
prayer, pleading with God to allow the cities to survive if there
live within them righteous individuals who can lead the people to
repent. 21 Abraham's plea for mercy, in behalf of those whose past
conduct stands diametrically opposed to the essence of his own
values, captures the essential kindness that he embodies. 22
In fact, Jewish tradition portrays Abraham's behavior vis-A-
vis Sodom and Gomorrah in stark contrast to Noah's attitude
toward the people in his generation, who are killed in the Flood
as punishment for their sinful behavior toward one another. 23
Notwithstanding the Torah's description of Noah's righteousness,
through which he merits survival from the Flood, 24 there remains
a degree of ambivalence toward Noah's character, both in the
Biblical text and among its expositors. 25  Notably, unlike
Abraham's impassioned attempts to elicit God's mercy for the
wrongdoers of Sodom and Gomorrah, Noah appears to accept
without protest God's decree that his entire generation will be
sentenced to death.
On a certain level, Noah's response to God's decree seems
understandable, if not, to some extent, correct. After all, the
Torah repeatedly describes in unusually strong terms the moral
and spiritual depths to which the Earth's inhabitants had fallen,
prompting God's judgment that they were utterly corrupt, thus
deserving of destruction.26 As God's decision was both inherently
fair and fully warranted, Noah's sense of justice may have
precluded him from lodging any objection to an appropriate
20 See Genesis 18:20.
21 See id. at 18:23-33.
22 DESSLER, supra note 13, at 181-82; see also RABBI NAFATALI TZVI BERLIN,
HA'EMEK DAVAR, Introduction to Commentary on Genesis.
23 See, e.g., DESSLER, supra note 13, at 181-82; SCHACHTER, supra note 18, at
168-69.
24 See, e.g., Genesis 6:8-9.
25 See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the
Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early
Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 33, 34 n.176
(2005) (describing, and applying in a contemporary context, ambivalence in the
Jewish tradition toward Noah's character).
26 See Genesis 6:5-12.
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punishment. 27 In Abraham's perspective, however, despite the
manifest justice of God's decree, perhaps a deeper form of justice
is realized when tempered by a suitable measure of mercy. 28
Therefore, when Abraham encounters the prospect of a just but
harsh punishment for the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, he
suggests that justice will be served if the members of the cities
are spared on account of true and sincere efforts to repent for
their wrongdoing. 29
Although Abraham's pleas ultimately prove unsuccessful,
apparently because he has overestimated the possibility of
repentance among the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, his
approach anticipates and reflects accurately the complementary
principles of divine justice and mercy in Jewish thought. Indeed,
repentance and atonement, which serve as powerful
manifestations of mercy, play a crucial role in Jewish law and
philosophy, informing justice rather than opposing it.30
27 See DESSLER, supra note 13, at 181-82.
28 See id. Notably, in his pleas for mercy in behalf of the cities of Sodom and
Gomorrah, Abraham expressly appeals to and invokes God's judgment and justice.
See Genesis 18:25.
29 See DESSLER, supra note 13, at 181-82.
30 See Samuel J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look at Repentance, Forgiveness and
Atonement in Jewish Law and Philosophy and American Legal Thought, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1677, 1678-80 (2000). For applications of these concepts to the
American legal system, see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87-90
(2004); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1804
(1999); Erik Luna, The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3-
4 (2003); Michael A. Simons, Born Again on Death Row: Retribution, Remorse, and
Religion, 43 CATH. LAW. 311, 330-31 (2004); Michael A. Simons, Retribution for
Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 33-36 (2003);
Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1347, 1356,
1369 (2000).
Perhaps the most dramatic example of divine mercy, forgiveness for the sin of
the Golden Calf, serves as a model for the operation of atonement. See Exodus
32:30-34:10. In Jewish tradition, God granted forgiveness on the tenth day of the
seventh month, a date that would thus function for future generations as Yom
Kippur, the Day of Atonement. See ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, REFLECTIONS OF THE RAV:
LESSONS IN JEWISH THOUGHT, ADAPTED FROM LECTURES BY RABBI JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK 51-52 (1981). In depicting God's response to the nation's sincere
repentance, the verses describe God as rachum v'chanun, exercising mercy and
kindness. Exodus 34:6. Fittingly, these are the very qualities that likewise served as
the basis for Abraham's fulfillment of imitatio Dei, leading him to found the nation
through the practice of mercy and kindness toward all others. See supra notes 10-13
and accompanying text.
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II. MERCY AND JUSTICE IN COMMUNAL LEADERSHIP
While Abraham epitomized mercy and kindness, those who
followed him as leaders of the nation were characterized by a
variety of qualities, often differing significantly from one another.
In fact, Jewish interpretive tradition provides a complex
understanding of the three founders of the nation, Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob, as serving complementary functions, each
representing and establishing an essential aspect of national
identity and consciousness. 31  To oversimplify-perhaps
inevitably-it appears that in carrying forward Abraham's
widespread legacy, his son Isaac exercises a more introverted
approach, lending a seemingly crucial element of strength and
stability to Abraham's revolutionary movement. 32  In turn,
Isaac's son Jacob serves yet a third foundational role,
synthesizing the outgoing kindness of his grandfather with the
inward focus of his father, thereby laying the groundwork for
both continuity and expansion.33
As Abraham's descendants grew into a nation of millions,
their leaders likewise began to evolve, producing models of
leadership beyond the paradigms represented by the founders.
Throughout much of Jewish history, the nation has been served
by what Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik described as a form of "dual
leadership." 34  Rabbi Soloveitchik delineated a typology of
leadership, corresponding to the justice/mercy dichotomy-or, to
use his terminology, the "chesed-emet dialectic."35 One type of
leader emphasizes the aspect of emet, truth, thus "demand[ing]
unbending justice."36  Such a leader engages in "criticizing,
31 See DESSLER, supra note 13, at 160-65.
32 See id. at 204-10; GOLDVICHT, supra note 13, at 155-64; SOLOVEITCHIK, supra
note 12, at 213-14; STEINSALTZ, IN THE BEGINNING supra note 13, at 130-32; ADIN
STEINSALTZ, BIBLICAL IMAGES 35 [hereinafter STEINSALTZ, BIBLICAL IMAGES]
(Yehuda Hanegbi & Yehudit Keshet eds. and trans., 1984) ("Isaac is the symbol not
of the power that breaks through limitations and creates, but of the power that
conserves and maintains things in their place" and that Isaac "showed a marked
inclination toward stability.").
33 See DESSLER, supra note 13, at 211-16; GOLDVICHT, supra note 13, at 165-
89; STEINSALTZ, BIBLICAL IMAGES, supra note 32, at 37 (stating that Jacob "was a
synthesis, an integration of both Abraham and Isaac" and that he was thus "the
keeper of tradition who was also an innovator").
34 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 160.
35 JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, DIVREi HAGUT VE-HA'ARACHA 205 (1981). Robert
Weisberg has referred to this tension as the "justice-mercy conundrum." Weisberg,
supra note 3, at 1416; see also infra note 62.
36 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 165.
2006]
462 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:455
exhorting, holding people accountable for transgressions and
failures, 37 because strict justice requires that "[o]ne must be
rewarded according to one's merits."38 The second type of leader
"is primarily guided by chesed, limitless compassion and
overflowing kindness."39  This kind of leader personifies
"unqualified love," a love "gratuitous as well as boundless."40
In Rabbi Soloveitchik's framework, these competing models
of leadership differ in both style and substance. For example, the
leader whose focus is truth and justice "rebukes the sinner in
harsh language," "loudly scorns iniquity," and "fights for truth
through exhortation and instruction," presenting sermons "often
harsh, saturated with prophetic indignation."41 In contrast, the
leader whose emphasis is mercy and kindness "sheds a tear of
sympathy for the sinner," "speaks softly," and "reproach[es] the
sinner the way a loving mother reproaches a mischievous child,"
offering sermons that are "subdued, saturated with prophetic
love."4
2
Through further analysis, however, Rabbi Soloveitchik
concludes that in practice, neither model of leadership succeeds
in isolation or in its purely idealized form. In particular, he
explains, a leader who acts entirely out of love and mercy will
arguably "betray truth, [ J encourage mediocrity, and [ ] allow the
inauthentic to distort the teachings of God."43 Conversely, "to be
absolutely truthful is to love only some people and to alienate
many who are genuine in their hearts and who are earnestly
searching."44
In Jewish thought, the conundrum presented by these
concerns proves so formidable as to compel the acknowledgment
that complete "reconciliation of the attribute of strict justice and
the attribute of compassion is achieved only in God."45 Humans,
nevertheless, may and must resort to "a relative solution to this
dilemma, depending upon [the] temperament and outlook" of the
37 Id.
38 Id.






45 Id. at 166-67.
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particular leader, tending toward either mercy or justice.46 Thus,
in response to the inevitable problem, "both [kinds of leader]
have discovered a formula to harmonize chesed and emet,"
although "one emphasizes emet and the other chesed."47 In short,
"[tihey both love and are committed to the truth, yet they act
differently. '48
Significantly, according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, the two
approaches ideally complement one another, through a form of
combined leadership that incorporates both "teaching... by
instruction" and "warm and friendly guidance."49 Tracing the
course of Jewish history, Rabbi Soloveitchik identifies repeated
instances of dual-natured leadership, beginning with the very
first leaders of the independent nation, Moses and Aaron. 50 To be
sure, "[b]oth of them enlightened minds, molded characters, and
propagated the word of God. Both led their communities along
righteous paths and made sacrifices for their welfare." 51 At the
same time, however, "their methods, their approaches, the media
they employed were different." 52 Specifically, Rabbi Soloveitchik
cites Talmudic depictions contrasting Moses' insistence on strict
justice and truth with Aaron's tendency toward kindness and
peace. 53 Thus, "[i]n terms of ultimate objectives, they were very
close to each other, but their emphases varied."54 Notably, rather
than favoring a particular leader or method of leadership,
Midrashic teachings acknowledge the necessity and importance
of both Moses and Aaron, each playing a vital role in the life of
the nation.55
Likewise, turning to an analysis of modern times, Rabbi
Soloveitchik finds a parallel dialectic in the different rabbinic
models of the Lithuanian Rav and the Eastern European
Chassidic Rebbe. The former emphasizes emet, primarily
"engag[ing] the intellect, analyzing, classifying, clarifying, and
46 Id. at 166.
47 Id. at 167.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 160, 167; see also SCHACHTER, supra note 18, at 262-65.
51 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 161.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 167; see also STEINsALTZ, BIBLICAL IMAGES, supra note 32, at 73-78.
54 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 161.
55 See id. at 168 n.13. For a discussion of the different roles of Moses and Aaron,
see RABBENU NISIM BEN REUBEN GERONDI, DERASHOT 35-43 (Leon A. Feldman ed.,
1973).
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transmitting the details of [Jewish law] with precision,"56 while
the latter relies upon chesed, focusing on "the invisible,
intangible soul of the Torah,... communicat[ing] with the heart"
and teaching "to feel, not only to understand."57 Nevertheless,
Rabbi Soloveitchik observes, "[n]owadays,... the contemporary
[Ray] has absorbed many qualities of the Rebbe, not only
teaching but coming close to [the] people,"58 while the Rebbe "now
also emphasizes scholarship and the teaching role."59  Thus,
"[t]he classic differences are still there, but the lines of
demarcation are at times blurred."60  Ultimately, he concludes,
"Jewish leadership is most effective when it combines the mind
and heart in the worship of God. '61
III. MERCY AND JUSTICE IN THE JURIDICAL CONTEXT
In addition to the vital role mercy has played in the founding
of the Jewish nation and in the conduct of its leadership, the
centrality of mercy in Jewish thought manifests itself, perhaps
most strikingly, in the juridical context. At first glance,
principles of mercy appear inconsistent with, if not antithetical
to, the discipline of legal decision-making. After all, unlike the
communal leader who prudently exercises mercy, when
appropriate, to balance and temper the demands of justice, the
very basis of judicial responsibility requires the administration of
strict justice, seemingly without resort to notions of mercy. 62
56 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 161.
57 Id. at 162-63. For a helpful introduction to this aspect of Chassidic thought,
see ARYEH KAPLAN, THE LIGHT BEYOND: ADVENTURES IN HASSIDIC THOUGHT 1-25
(1981). To illustrate this approach, both Rabbi Soloveitchik and Rabbi Kaplan quote
a famous Chassidic tale:
A teamster in Berdichov was saying his morning prayers, and at the
same time, was greasing the wheels of his wagon. He was indeed an
interesting sight, praying with his grease-covered hands, and
townspeople snickered, "Look at this ignoramus. He doesn't know better
than to grease his wagon wheels while he is praying." The great
[Chassidic Rebbe] Levi Yitzchok then came along and said, "Master of
the universe, look at Your servant, the teamster. Even while he is
greasing his wagon wheels he is still praising Your great and holy
Name."
Id. at 5; see also BESDIN, supra note 30, at 166.




62 As Professor Weisberg puts it, the concept of a "jurisprudence of mercy"
proves "paradoxical." Weisberg, supra note 3, at 1415. Specifically, he explains that
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Indeed, the Talmudic discussion of the concept of peshara, a
form of settlement through arbitration, reflects the inherent
tension underlying the relationship between exercising mercy
and meting out justice. 63 According to one view in the Talmud,
peshara is prohibited, as it works a distortion of God's law.64
Although advocates of this position recognize the value of mercy
and peace in interpersonal relations, 65 they insist on a legal
"mercy has a jurisprudence only if it fits within some theory of law or is rooted in
some internal legal principle." Id. At the same time, however, "the most
fundamental question raised by any act of pardon or commutation is precisely
whether mercy is part of, or at least consistent with, justice." Id. In short, "[ius mercy
an act outside justice, in a separate realm[,] or is it an act of injustice?" Id. (italics in
original).
An extensive body of literature has emerged among American legal scholars
addressing the apparent tension between, and possible compatibility of, justice and
mercy. For a discussion of the application of mercy to criminal justice, often focusing
on capital punishment, see, e.g., A Colloquium on the Jurisprudence of Mercy:
Capital Punishment and Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1279 (2004); Clemency and
Pardons Symposium, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 177 (1993); Symposium, Forgiveness & The
Law: Executive Clemency and the American System of Justice, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 139
(2003); Symposium, The Law and Politics of the Death Penalty: Abolition,
Moratorium, or Reform?, 81 OR. L. REV. 1 (2002); Anthony V. Alfieri, Mercy Lawyers,
82 N.C. L. Rev. 1297, 1297 (2004); Stephen P. Garvey, 'As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven" Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 989-92 (1996);
Garvey, supra note 3, at 1323-24 n.19 (citing sources); Samuel J. Levine, Playing
God: An Essay on Law, Philosophy, and American Capital Punishment, 31 N.M.
L. REV. 277, 277-78 (2001); Samuel J. Levine, Portraits of Criminals on Bruce
Springsteen's Nebraska: The Enigmatic Criminal, the Sympathetic Criminal, and the
Criminal as Brother, 14 WIDENER L.J. 767, 774-76, 783 (2005); Daniel Markel,
Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1421-23 (2004); sources cited supra note 30.
Likewise, a number of law review articles have discussed the application of
mercy to criminal justice in the Jewish legal system, in particular in the context of
capital punishment. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law
and its Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1037, 1037-38 (1998); Levine, supra note 30, at 1677-79; Suzanne
Last Stone, Justice, Mercy, and Gender in Rabbinic Thought, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LITERATURE 139, 139 (1996); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt:
Henry Friendly Meets the MaHaRal of Prague, 90 MICH. L. REV. 604, 614-18 (1991);
Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule
Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 955, 956 (1988); Irene Merker
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on "Eye for Eye" and the
Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 508, 510, 515 (1998) (stating that under
Jewish law, capital punishment is very difficult to impose); Irene Merker Rosenberg
& Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God's Mercy and the Four Biblical Methods of Capital
Punishment: Stoning, Burning, Beheading, and Strangulation, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169,
1170, 1174-75 (2004).
63 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b.
64 See id.
65 Thus, some commentators on the Talmud explain that under this view,
although Moses served as a judge and accordingly applied strict rules of law, Aaron,
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system that operates strictly on the basis of principles of law.
Nevertheless, the prevailing view in the Talmud understands
mercy as informing justice rather than opposing it.66 Under this
view, peshara becomes not merely permissible, but meritorious,
preferable to the dictates of a stricter form of justice.67
Similar to his analysis of the roles of different types of
communal leaders, 68  Rabbi Soloveitchik articulates the
complementary, rather than contradictory, functions of mercy
and justice in the Jewish legal system. Again delineating a
dialectic more than a dichotomy, Rabbi Soloveitchik first
poignantly portrays the setting of strictly legal procedure as
pit[ting] one party against the other. The [judge] analyzes
the relevant facts of the case and applies the appropriate
legal sanctions as prescribed by [ ] the codes. The law is
administered with cold impartiality and its decisions are
dictated by objective data. One party emerges the victor,
[its] case vindicated. The plea of the other is denied.
Discord and resentment persist even as the court docket is
cleared and the case is closed. The legal issue has been
resolved, but human bitterness continues to fester.69
In contrast, Rabbi Soloveitchik suggests, in the exercise of
peshara,
social harmony is the main concern of the [judge]. The
fine points of the law and the determination of precise
facts are of secondary importance. The goal is not to be
juridically astute but to be socially healing. The
psychology of the contenders, their socio-economic status
who did not function in a judicial capacity, resolved disputes through the exercise of
more peaceful settlements. TOSAFOT, Commentary on TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b;
see also infra Part II (distinguishing between the roles of Moses and Aaron).
66 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b.
67 See id.; MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH (Code of Law), Laws of Sanhedrin 22:4.
The attitudes underlying the Talmudic debate are echoed in contemporary American
legal scholarship relating to civil settlement and alternative dispute resolution.
Compare, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073, 1075
(1984) (providing a contrary view that "settlement is a capitulation to the conditions
of mass society and should be neither encouraged or praised") with David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2619-20 (1995);
Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660,
1665-67 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Practicing "In the Interests of Justice" in
the Twenty-First Century: Pursuing Peace as Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761,
1762-63 (2002); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881,
886-87 (2004) (believing negotiation to be a "credible alternative to litigation").
68 See supra Part II.
69 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 53-54.
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and values, as well as the general temper of society, are
the primary ingredients employed in the peshara process.
These considerations are evaluated within the broad
[legal] parameters of the [codes], and the final resolution
of the conflict is a delicate and sensitive blending of both
objective legal norms and subjective humanistic goals.
For this reason, peshara is the preferred alternative. 70
Significantly, Rabbi Soloveitchik emphasizes that the
administration of peshara serves as part of the legal system
rather than independent of it; peshara "does not contradict the
law but is its preferred and finest fulfillment. '71 Therefore, he
notes that "[n]umerous... strictures establish the legal structure
wherein peshara operates." 72  As in other legal cases, for
example: a judge presides over the proceedings; the parties effect
a formal legal agreement "obligat[ing them] to abide by the
outcome and establish[ing] the status of the presiding court";
and, like other legal proceedings, peshara takes place only during
daylight.73
Moreover, as Rabbi Soloveitchik observes, the Talmud cites
two Biblical verses to support the institution of peshara, each of
which illuminates the place of peshara in the legal system. The
first verse cited in the Talmud, from the book of Zechariah,
quotes God's command to "execute the judgment of truth and
peace in your gates."74  The Talmudic exegesis of this verse
initially finds an apparently paradoxical obligation to exercise a
form of justice that incorporates both truth and peace. As the
Talmud formulates the problem, "where there is strict justice
there is no peace, and where there is peace, there is not strict
justice."75  Elaborating on the Talmud's question, Rabbi
Soloveitchik explains that "[w]here there is strict adherence to
[justice], there is justice but no [peace], because one of the parties
is humiliated and antagonized. The immediate issue is resolved
but the conflict persists, with ensuing social discord."76
70 Id. at 54.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. See generally Rav Moshe Taragin, The Role of Peshara Within the
Halakhic Judicial System, http://jlaw.com/Articles/roleof.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2006) (giving a general overview of peshara and noting the different opinions of what
peshara actually means).
74 Zechariah 8:16.
75 TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b.
76 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 55.
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The Talmud resolves the apparent contradiction, however,
concluding that the legal procedure of peshara provides a form of
justice that synthesizes truth and peace.77  In Rabbi
Soloveitchik's view, the Talmud's resolution provides a valuable
insight into the roles of both justice and the judge in the Jewish
legal system:
[T]he Torah... wants the [udge] to be not only a magistrate
but a teacher and a healer... seek[ing] to persuade both
parties to retreat from their presumed points of advantage, and
[ ] preach[ing] to them about the corrosive personal and social
effects of sustained rancor. [The judge's] responsibility is
primarily to enlighten, rather than to render decisions on points
of law. 7
8
Thus, Rabbi Soloveitchik explains, the Talmud understands
the Biblical verse as "project[ing] the social welfare of society and
the happiness of individuals as primary ideals, as being truly a
higher form of justice. Peshara is socially and morally preferred,
even if the strict [justice] is neutralized. In its highest sense,
justice obtains when people are reconciled."79
The second Biblical verse quoted in the Talmud, from the
book of Samuel, reports that King David "executed justice and
righteousness toward his people."80  The Talmud is initially
troubled by a seemingly inherent tension between the virtues
depicted, stating that "where there is strict justice there is no
righteousness, and where there is righteousness there is no
justice."81 According to Rabbi Soloveitchik, the Talmud premises
77 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b.
78 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 55-56; see also Aviam Soifer, Covered Bridges, 17
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 55, 78 n. 109 (2005); AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE
KEEP 167-75 (1995); see generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and ADR:
Insights from the Jewish Tradition, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007 (2001).
79 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 56.
80 2 Samuel 8:15.
81 TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b. The analysis in the text translates the term
"tzedaka" in the Biblical verse as "righteousness." An alternate translation of
"tzedaka" as "charity" yields a somewhat different analysis, as the Talmud's question
is then triggered by the verse's praising the seemingly incompatible virtues of justice
and charity. The Talmud's resolution then offers peshara as a means of
accomplishing both justice and charity.
Notably, the word "tzedaka" is rooted in the word "tzedek," often translated as
"justice." Accordingly, although the obligation in Jewish law to help those in need of
assistance is often translated as "charity," the root of the word "tzedaka" may
suggest "social justice" as a more meaningful and accurate translation. Indeed, the
existence of formal-and legally enforceable-obligations to assist those in need
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its question on the understanding that "when two litigants
present opposing claims, only one can be right."82 If so, "[s]trict
logic demands the application of [strict justice] whereby the claim
of the righteous party will be vindicated while the other party
will be discredited." 83
Again, however, the Talmud reconciles the apparent conflict,
identifying peshara as a means of providing justice along with
righteousness. 84 Expanding on the Talmud's response, Rabbi
Soloveitchik suggests that Jewish law "believes that absolute
right and wrong can be realized only in heaven. In dealing with
imperfect [humans], we posit that no [one] is totally wrong or
right and that, in the case of the litigants, both are partially right
and wrong."85 In fact, "each [litigant] has some responsibility for
the situation and is partially guilty of the misunderstanding, for
misleading innuendos, and for contributing indirectly to a
climate in society which places others at a disadvantage. 86
reflects the place of "tzedaka" in the system of justice. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK,
YEMEI ZICHARON 43-45 (1996) (citing TALMUD BAVLI, Baba Bathra 8b;
MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 3:53); see also MEIR TAMARI, WITH ALL
YOUR POSSESSIONS: JEWISH ETHICS AND ECONOMIC LIFE 248-62 (1987).
Thus, tzedaka may serve as an illustration of the emphasis on obligation as a
fundamental component of the Jewish legal system. See, e.g., SOL ROTH, HALAKHA
AND POLITICS: THE JEWISH IDEA OF THE STATE 97 (1988); Steven F. Friedell, Aaron
Kirschenbaum on Equity in Jewish Law, 1993 BYU L. REV. 909, 913 (1993) (book
review); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions
and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework,
77 TUL. L. REV. 527, 544-45 (2003) [hereinafter Levine, Taking Ethics Codes
Seriously] (citing Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social
Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65, 65 (1987); Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish
Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 306, 313-14 (1961); see also Samuel J. Levine,
Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A
Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 512
(1998).
For applications of a similar approach to areas of the American legal system, see,
e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1112 (1986); Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (1991-1992); Samuel J.
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical
Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 43 (2003); Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously,
supra note 81, at 544-45.
82 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 56.
83 Id.
84 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b.
85 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 56; see also Joseph Blau, Ray Chesed v'Emet, in
YKARA D'CHAIM: A MEMORIAL VOLUME IN HONOR OF RABBI CHAIM YAAKOV
GOLDWICHT 83-84 (Daniel Feldman et al. eds., 1996).
86 BESDIN, supra note 30, at 57.
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Thus, the Talmud acknowledges the limitations of strict
justice, which "take[s] account [only] of obvious surface
conditions[,] fail[ing] to perceive subtleties underneath, which
dilute our certainty about the right and wrong of the litigants."
87
In short, "[s]trict justice deals with plain facts and salient reality;
real responsibility, however, goes much deeper and is obscured
from the scrutiny of the court. Metaphysically, no one is entirely
absolved in situations of conflict."88  Ultimately, then,
righteousness "is truly realized only through peshara, which
declares the parties both winners and losers .... The principle of
[righteousness] demands that [justice] reflect the existential
condition of [humans'] inevitable imperfection."8 9
CONCLUSION
In an Essay dedicated to both the jurisprudential legacy of
Pope John Paul II and an examination of the place of justice,
mercy, and reconciliation in Jewish thought, it may be fitting to
close on a note of appreciation for the Pope's historic efforts at
reconciliation in Catholic-Jewish relations. Indeed, countless




90 See, e.g., Rita Ciolli, Pope John Paul II: Reaching out to Jews, NEWSDAY, Apr.
6, 2005, at A37 (quoting positive reflections of Stephen Savitsky, president of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, and Professor Jacob Neusner);
Glenn Frankel, Pope Reconciled with Many but Made Special Efforts with Jews,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2005, at A17 (quoting Rabbi Elio Toaff, former Chief Rabbi of
Rome, who recalled the Pope's 1986 visit to the Great Synagogue in Rome, and
noting that Rabbi Toaff was one of only two living people mentioned in the Pope's
will); Herb Keinon, Israel Mourns Pontiff Who Remade Catholic-Jewish Ties,
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at 9 (quoting the statement of Israel's Foreign
Minister Silvan Shalom that "Israel[,] the Jewish people[,] and the entire world
today lost a great champion of reconciliation and brotherhood between the faiths[,]"
and that "[t]he State of Israel joins all those who mourn his loss"); Lisa Palmieri-
Billig, Jewish Delegation Helps Celebrate 'Life of Man Who Touched Millions,'
JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 10, 2005, at 6 (quoting Haifa Chief Rabbi Shear Yashuv
Cohen stating that the Pope was "the first to say that our Biblical Covenant was
eternally valid and not outdated or replaced by the New Covenant of the
Christians--'because Our Lord does not take back His promises.' He went to the
synagogue[,] came to Israel[, and] asked for forgiveness"); id. (quoting Rabbi Israel
Singer of the World Jewish Congress, stating that "[t]hrough the remarkable will
and acts of this [P]ope[,] relations between Catholics and Jews have improved more
in the last 20 years than between Jews and the rest of the world" and that the Pope
"made it possible for Orthodox Jews to participate in the [Catholic-Jewish] dialogue
by not ignoring their [religious] requirements"); id. (quoting Rabbi David Rosen of
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admiration for the Pope's words and deeds vis-A-vis the Jewish
religion, Jewish history, and the State of Israel.91
Through these efforts, the Pope exhibited a profound interest
in the pursuit of justice and truth, together with an abiding
fidelity to mercy, love, and compassion. As this Essay aims to
demonstrate, the significance of these qualities manifests itself
not only in areas of personal conduct and communal leadership,
but also in the proper and righteous administration and
application of legal principles and policies. Thus, viewed in the
perspective of this Essay, Pope John Paul II's attitudes and
actions toward Jewish communities and concerns established an
important element of his jurisprudential legacy, one that
deserves to be recognized, honored, and emulated by those who
follow.
the American Jewish Congress, speaking of the Pope's "remarkably positive attitude
towards Jews and Judaism[,]" his visit to Israel, and that the Pope "enshrined the
positive new theology concerning the Jewish people and Judaism into the very fabric
of the Catholic Church"); Douglas Turner, Jews Mourning Loss of Revolutionary
Pope, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 11, 2005, at A6 (quoting Abraham H. Foxman, national
director of the Anti-Defamation League, stating that the Pope "repaired the history
of pain, anguish[,] and contempt of 2,000 years").
91 See DIVES INMISERICORDA, supra note 1, passim.
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